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M ymandate as a survey author is to isolate and discuss significant
developments relating to the trial and appeal of Texas criminal
cases. Perhaps the most significant developments to be discerned
transcend the decision of any individual case. As the court of criminal ap-
peals ends its first decade as a discretionary review court, it properly seems
less concerned with correcting errors in individual cases and more comforta-
ble limiting itself to the larger issues of criminal procedure. While the court
occasionally decides issues that arguably should have been left to the courts
of appeals, the judges seem more in harmony with the court's responsibility
to address issues of broad scope and to formulate consistent standards for
the trial and appeal of criminal cases.
The pervasive underlying concern presently seems to be the reliability of
the conviction, as reflected, for example, in the preoccupation with the evi-
dentiary standards on appeal and the concept of harmless error. As the
court of criminal appeals (emulating the approach of the Supreme Court of
the United States) becomes less and less concerned with particular errors
that do not impact on the outcome of a criminal trial, it becomes more con-
cerned generally with the fairness and appearance of fairness in the trial. A
harmless error analysis inevitably requires the appellate court to examine
both the prosecutor's motives and the overall fairness of the process.
Predictably, as the court of criminal appeals reaches these broader issues,
the philosophical or "political" differences of individual judges on the court
become apparent. The judges themselves seem increasingly willing to openly
acknowledge those differences.' A respect for the rule of law requires us to
believe that it is the rule of law and not the personal predilections of judges
that determine particular results. Judges do not reach results and then rea-
son backwards. One cannot deny, however, that the individual values and
beliefs of a judge affect that judge's view of what the law should be and what
the law is. The recent changes in the makeup of the court is a significant
0
*Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law; J.D., Washington University (St.
Louis); B.S., Saint Ambrose University. The research help of third-year law student Erika
Plurnlee is gratefully acknowledged.
1. See Castillo v. State, No. 339-89, 340-89, 341-89, 7 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App., Oct. 31,
1990) (Judge Campbell objecting strenuously to implication of dissenting Judge McCormick
that he is "soft" on crime).
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development that assuredly will affect the law of criminal procedure in this
state.
I. TRIAL
A. Removal of Counsel
In two cases the court of criminal appeals defined the authority of a trial
judge to remove either the District Attorney or court-appointed defense
counsel from a criminal case. In Stearnes v. Clinton2 the court considered
the authority of the trial court to remove a court-appointed attorney over the
objection of the defendant and the attorney. In Stearnes, after the defendant
had been indicted for capital murder, the court appointed two attorneys to
defend him. The District Attorney's office had a policy that a defense attor-
ney needed permission from the District Attorney's office to interview any of
the State's witnesses. Appointed counsel McLarty made a written request to
interview the State's key witness, who had previously been in protective cus-
tody, but did not receive a response. The witness contacted McLarty, how-
ever, and agreed to talk with him. McLarty arranged an interview at the
witness's home. During the interview, the witness called the assistant dis-
trict attorney assigned to the case and decided not to say anything further
until the assistant district attorney arrived. When she did arrive, the prose-
cutor informed McLarty that the interview was over.3
At a hearing on the defendant's motion to depose the State's key witness,
the trial judge granted the District Attorney's oral motion to remove Mc-
Larty and his co-counsel from the case because they had violated the State's
policy regarding interviewing a witness. The judge appointed a new attorney
to represent the defendant, claiming that McLarty had so antagonized the
district attorney's office that he would be unable to get any cooperation
from them.4
Relying on decisions from the California Supreme Court5 and the District
of Columbia Circuit Court, 6 the Texas court concluded that "the power of
the trial court to appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants does not
carry with it the concomitant power to remove counsel at his discretionary
whim."'7 So long as a defense attorney acts within legal and ethical bounda-
ries, his loyalty is to his client, not to the agency that pays his fee.8
Even though an indigent defendant does not have the right to an attorney
of his choice, once an attorney is appointed an attorney-client relationship is
established. This attorney-client relationship is entitled to the same protec-
tion as the retained counsel relationship. 9 The trial court, however, has the
2. 780 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
3. Id. at 218.
4. Id. at 219.
5. Smith v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 440 P.2d 65 (1968).
6. Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
7. Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 223 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
8. Id. at 222.
9. Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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power to take appropriate steps to ensure both the integrity of the proceed-
ings and the effectiveness of counsel's representation. Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld a trial court's refusal to allow dual
representation when there was an actual or serious potential for conflict. 0
What is not clear, however, is the court's authority to remove counsel
whom the trial judge determines to be acting incompetently. In Stearnes
McLarty was not removed for incompetence, but for his competence.11
Moreover, McLarty had done nothing improper. The District Attorney's
local rule for interviewing witnesses was at best "tenuous and in actuality
... a legal nullity."' 12 Such a rule conflicted with principles of fair play and
contravened a defense lawyer's duty to ferret out and interview the State's
potential witnesses.' 3 Faced with the "local rule" and the duty to effectively
represent his client, McLarty was between the proverbial "rock and a hard
place,"' 14 and the course he chose was the right one. The court buttressed its
conclusion by observing that to condone removal would encourage other
judges to act accordingly and would disrupt the effectiveness and indepen-
dence of the criminal defense bar. 15 Therefore, short of legal or ethical vio-
lations by defense counsel, a trial judge may not remove a validly appointed
criminal defense attorney over the objection of that attorney and the
defendant.
The focus shifted to prosecutorial removal in State ex rel. Eidson v. Ed-
wards.16 A Taylor County district judge ordered the disqualification of the
Taylor County District Attorney and his entire office in a capital murder
prosecution. ' 7 A court-appointed attorney, Ross Adair, represented the de-
fendant Clayton in his capital murder case. Adair interviewed witnesses and
had several conferences with the defendant, thereby obtaining confidential,
protected information. He also acted as lead counsel at Clayton's examining
trial. Adair ended his representation of Clayton when he was appointed
County Court at Law Judge. Co-counsel took over Clayton's defense. Fol-
lowing the primary election for the County Court at Law judgeship, Adair
resigned that position and sought employment with the district attorney's
office. Adair never discussed the Clayton case with anyone in the District
Attorney's office, and did not participate in the prosecution in any way. In
fact, the District Attorney explicitly told Adair not to discuss the case with
anyone in that office nor to allow anyone to discuss it with him. Although
finding no impropriety or unethical behavior on the part of Adair, the trial
10. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
11. Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
12. Id. at 224.
13. See Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (rex. Crim. App. 1980). Duffy held that a de-
fense attorney has a duty to make an independent investigation of the facts and a failure to
seek out and interview potential witnesses was ineffective assistance of counsel; see also Sulli-
van v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382, 1393 (7th Cir. 1987) (failure to find and interview witnesses
identified in police report was ineffective assistance).
14. 780 S.W.2d at 224.
15. Id. at 225.
16. 793 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
17. Id. at 3.
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judge, on motion of Clayton's attorney, disqualified the entire office from
prosecuting Clayton's case "to avoid the appearance of impropriety."'"
The court of criminal appeals held that the issue of the court's authority
to remove the prosecutor was not moot even though special prosecutors had
already been appointed and had obtained a conviction, because the disquali-
fication had continued into the appellate stage and Clayton still had two
outstanding indictments in Taylor County. 19 The court concluded that the
district attorney's office is constitutionally created and is therefore constitu-
tionally protected. 20 Moreover, the district attorney's office by statute must
represent the state in all criminal cases except in the case of actual conflict of
interest.21
A plurality of the court found that the trial judge had effectively removed
the District Attorney from his elected office to the extent of his prosecution
of Clayton. 22 Texas recognizes only three causes for removal of a county
official, including the District Attorney: 1) incompetency; 2) official miscon-
duct; or, 3) intoxication. 23 Even in those instances, removal can be only
after a trial by jury. The trial judge could not remove the District Attorney
as none of the three requisite causes were present nor was the District Attor-
ney afforded a trial by jury. If a conflict of interest exists, the District Attor-
ney is obliged to recuse himself, but the trial judge is not under a duty to
remove him.24 Accordingly, the trial court's order was void and mandamus
would lie to restore the prosecutor to his office. 25
The dissenting opinion accused the majority of that which it expressly
disclaimed, namely, exempting prosecutors from the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 26 The dissent argued that the trial judge had both the au-
thority and discretion to disqualify the District Attorney's office to avoid
potential conflicts of interest in violation of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility.27 The majority, on the other hand, distinguished district attorney's
and private attorneys, noting that a district attorney's job is constitutionally
created and protected.28
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id.; TEx. CONST. art. V, § 21.
21. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 44.321(a) (Vernon 1988) (stating that "the Criminal
District Attorney of Taylor County shall perform all the duties in Taylor County required of
District Attorneys by general law."); see also TEX. CODE CraM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.02 (Vernon
1989) (providing that each district attorney must represent the state in all criminal matters in
its district).
22. Four judges concurred in the result but disagreed that removing a District Attorney
from a particular case was tantamount to removal from office. 793 S.W.2d at 7.
23. TEx. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 87.013 (Vernon 1988).
24. State ex rel. Eidson v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
25. Id. at 5. The court rejected the reasoning in Sherrod v. Carey, 790 S.W.2d 705, 709(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ), that disqualification of the district attorney was a matter
of discretion for the trial court under his duty to ensure due process. 793 S.W.2d at 5-6 n.5.
26. 793 S.W.2d at 10 (Teague, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 7.
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B. Prosecutional Responsibility
The issue of the proper role and scope of prosecutorial authority is cur-
rently popular. The focus of Barefield v. State29 was the scope of prosecutor
authority under the separation of powers doctrine.30 In Barefield the de-
fendant was convicted of abduction and murder and sentenced to death.31
Barefield contended that allowing a prosecutor to determine which cases
constituted capital murder violated the separation of powers doctrine.
Namely, allowing a prosecutor this power conflicts with the legislature's
power to define crimes and to set the penalty range for those crimes. The
argument was not unreasonable, given the vague and subjective contours of
the doctrine emerging from some of the court's earlier decisions.32 The court
distinguished Rose v. State,33 which involved the legislative branch's abroga-
tion of the executive branch's powers through its creation of a parole law
instruction. The court found the State's decision to seek a capital murder
conviction not analogous to the legislature's power to define penalty
ranges.34 Accordingly, the separation of powers doctrine was nlot violated.
In Ex parte Brandley35 the court addressed the prosecution's obligations
in the investigation of a case. On habeas a petitioner who had been con-
victed of capital murder asserted that the State's investigative procedures
were so suggestive of his guilt as to create false testimony calculated to man-
ufacture circumstantial evidence against him in violation of his right to due
process and a fair trial. The habeas judge agreed with the defendant and
found the State's "blind focus" during the investigation ignored leads that
were inconsistent with the defendant's involvement in the crime.3 6 The
court of criminal appeals cited Foster v. California 37 for the proposition that
the State's investigation may be so improper and suggestive as to lead to a
deprivation of the defendant's due process rights.38 An examination of the
totality of the circumstances led a majority of the court to conclude that the
cumulative effect of the State's procedures deprived Brandley of due process
by suppressing evidence favorable to him and creating false and unreliable
testimony.3 9
The majority focused on a number of factors, without holding that any
one of them was reversible constitutional error. The officer in charge of the
investigation had arrested the defendant janitor at the school where the mur-
der was committed before interviewing any witnesses. The officer took the
defendant's co-workers on a "walk-through" of the events on the day of the
29. 784 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
30. TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1.
31. 784 S.W.2d at 39.
32. See Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Meshell v. State, 739
S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
33. 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
34. 784 S.W.2d at 46.
35. 781 S.W.2d 886 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
36. Id. at 887.
37. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
38. 781 S.W.2d at 891.
39. Id. at 894.
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crime. The officer was unable from the "walk-through" to elicit any informa-
tion that might have cast suspicion on the defendant. The chief investigator
ignored leads that pointed away from the walk-through version of events
and he intimidated and threatened the State's key witness. Finally, the State
did not perform tests on blood and hair that were found on the victim and
subsequently lost. One should take care not to interpret Brandley as impos-
ing a due process duty on the State to conduct any particular kind of investi-
gation or to search for exculpatory evidence. The majority found a violation
of due process because of the State's suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused and creation by the State of false and inherently unreliable testi-
mony.4 Two judges rounding out the majority concurred only because the
habeas hearing judge specifically found that the State created false testi-
mony.41 The three dissenting judges, disagreed that anything exculpatory
was suppressed or that material false testimony was created.42
Duggan v. State43 involved the State's failure to correct misleading testi-
mony during trial. The defendant was convicted of possession of
methamphetamine." At trial, in an attempt to impeach the testimony of
two alleged accomplices, defense counsel asked if they had exchanged their
testimony for the State's promise of leniency. Both witnesses denied this
allegation. At the hearing for a new trial, however, the District Attorney
admitted he had agreed to leniency in exchange for the accomplice's testi-
mony.45 The lack of a formal agreement between the accomplices and the
District Attorney led the court of appeals to reject the defendant's claim that
the misleading testimony violated his due process and fair trial rights.46 Cit-
ing Burkhalter v. State, 47 the court of criminal appeals reversed. 48 The court
concluded that "It makes no difference whether the understanding is con-
summated by a wink, a nod and a handshake, or by a signed and notarized
formal document ceremoniously impressed with a wax seal. A deal is a
deal." 49 Because the testimony of the accomplices constituted a misrepresen-
tation to the court, the prosecutor had a constitutionally-mandated duty to
correct it.50 The court characterized the prosecutor as a trustee of the
State's interest in providing fair trials. In his "fiduciary" capacity, the prose-
cutor must ensure that the truth is before the court.51 The prosecutor need
not know the evidence is false; his conduct is gauged objectively according to
40. Id.
41. Id. at 895.
42. Id. at 896, 914-15.
43. 778 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
44. Id. at 466
45. Id. at 467.
46. Id. at 468.
47. 493 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
48. 778 S.W.2d at 468.
49. Id
50. Id.; see Williams v. State, 513 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Burkhalter v. State,
493 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see also Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
(every state must provide corrective judicial process for relief of persons convicted and impris-
oned for crime without due process of law).
51. 778 S.W.2d at 468.
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what he should have known.52 The false evidence, if not corrected, could
have misled the jury and denied the accused a fair trial. 53
C. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The court of criminal appeals continues to decide numerous allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Ex parte Walker 5 4 a jury convicted Sa-
muel Walker of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to 45 years in prison.
Walker contended in a habeas corpus proceeding that he had ineffective
assistance of counsel at both the guilt/innocence and penalty stages of his
prosecution. 5 The court of criminal appeals reiterated its two differing stan-
dards of effective assistance. The proper standard for the guilt-innocence
phase is the Strickland v. Washington 5 6 two-pronged test: 1) whether the
assistance was reasonably effective from an objective point of view under
prevailing professional standards, and 2) if ineffective, whether a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for the
ineffective assistance. 57 While Strickland articulates the standard for the
guilt-innocence phase, the Duffy standard is applied to review allegedly defi-
cient performance of defense counsel during the punishment phase. The in-
quiry under Duffy focuses on whether, based on the totality of
representation, counsel was reasonably likely to render and rendering rea-
sonably effective assistance. 58 Under this standard the complete representa-
tion by the attorney of the accused, including pre-trial, trial and sentencing,
is nevertheless considered.5 9 Applying its dual standard in Walker,6" the
court found that counsel's performance was deficient at both stages, but
granted relief only on punishment because of the deficient performance at
the punishment stage.61 Although obviously incompetent, counsel's per-
formance at the guilt-innocence stage did not undermine the couft's confi-
dence in the outcome under Strickland's second prong because of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt.62 Counsel's deficient representation at the
52. Id.
53. 778 S.W.2d at 469. The case was remanded for determination under TEx. R. App. P.
81(b)(2) whether the failure to correct the false evidence was reversible or harmless error. Id.
at 470.
54. 777 S.W.2d 427 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
55. Id. at 428. The trial court found an extensive list of deficiencies at the guilt-innocence
stage: 1) failure to notify the court she was not ready for trial despite being aware of the trial
date for three months; 2) perfunctory investigation despite access to the State's file; 3) failure to
visit the crime scene which was necessary to rebut the State's case on method of entry; 4)
failure to object to inadmissible evidence and to file pretrial motions; and 5) opening the door
to the admission of extraneous offenses. During the punishment stage, counsel allowed the
State to comment on the defendant's failure to testify and failed to object or request a curative
instruction and allowed an inadmissible prior conviction to be admitted without objection. Id.
at 429-30.
56. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
57. Id. at 694.
58. Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
59. Ex parte Walker, 777 S.W.2d 427, 431 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
60. 777 S.W.2d 427.
61. Id. at 432.
62. Id. at 430.
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punishment, including her responsibility for the admission of three otherwise
inadmissible extraneous aggravated robberies, however, did not meet the
Duffy standard of "reasonably effective" representation. 63
In Ex parte Cruz" the court justified the use of a separate standard of
effectiveness for the punishment stage in a non-capital case by referring to
language in Strickland in which the Supreme Court limited its holding to
punishment in capital cases. 65 The irony is that the Texas court applied a
standard developed in a capital case that it concedes it may now apply only
in non-capital cases, and then only at the sentencing stage. Such an ap-
proach presumably is not unconstitutional, if the Duffy standard is to be
regarded as more stringent than the Strickland formulation.66 It is doubtful,
however, that the results of many cases including Walker would be different
even if the Strickland formulation were applied across the board and it
makes little sense to perpetuate the vague standard of Duffy in any event.
In Ex parte Dietzman 67 the defendant claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel in the conduct of his appeal. The defendant argued that counsel
had: 1) failed to designate where in the record the bases of his points on
appeal were located; 2) failed to perfect a bill of exception for testimony of a
missing witness; and 3) failed to properly preserve objections by raising dif-
ferent objections on appeal than at trial. The defendant requested an out-of-
time appeal as he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 68 De-
fense counsel responded to the defendant's allegations of ineffective assist-
ance by first arguing that he did not properly designate the record because
that was a job for the court reporter and clerk according to local rules. Sec-
ond, he argued that he did not perfect a bill of exception for the missing
witness because he did not know what that witness would say. Third, he
argued that he did not cite to the record, "because he assumed the Court of
63. It is obvious from the court's opinion that Judge Duncan did not like the "prejudice"
prong of Strickland because its application is "at best problematical" and "requires us to play a
speculative game with a retrospective focus." 777 S.W.2d at 430. It seems equally obvious,
however, that even the Duffy standard applied by the court in Walker also has an outcome
focus, as evidenced by Judge Duncan's emphasis on the "impact" of counsel's performance on
the sentence itself.
The court also set aside the punishment in Ex parte Walker, 794 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990), in which the ineffective assistance was the failure to timely file a motion electingjury assessment of punishment. Although occurring during voir dire, the ineffectiveness was
characterized as relating to punishment, calling for application of the Duffy standard. Id. at
36. Four dissenting judges believed that a "single mistake" by an otherwise diligent attorney
did not make the "total representation" ineffective. Id. at 38. The majority, on the other hand,
saw counsel's failure to carry out the defendant's choice to have the jury set punishment as
analogous to not advising the defendant of the advantage of doing so (here, the judge's reputa-
tion for harsh sentences). Id. at 37. The split court attests that even the Duffy standard is not
easily applied.
64. 739 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
65. Id. at 57.
66. See Ex parte Walker, 777 S.W.2d 427, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). But cf. Ex parte
Walker, 794 S.W.2d, at 37 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
67. 790 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)(per curiam).
68. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Ward v. State, 740 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987) (defendant entitled to effective counsel on appeal).
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Criminal Appeals would read the record."' 69 Finally, he could not explain
why his objections on appeal did not conform to those he raised at trial. The
court held these responses to be inadequate to address the allegations made
by the defendant and found counsel ineffective. 70 Accordingly, the defend-
ant was entitled to an out-of-time appeal.71
In Ex parte Welborn 72 a habeas corpus petitioner previously convicted of
attempting to acquire a controlled substance by fraud was found to have
been denied effective assistance of counsel. 73 Among counsel's failures
found in toto to constitute ineffectiveness were: failure to voir dire the jury
on the law of parties, failure to interview any of the State's potential wit-
nesses, failure to object to the sheriff's testimony of defendant's being under
the influence of a controlled substance, failure to object to hearsay contained
in an offense report and a pen packet, and failure to investigate the possible
jury misconduct of which counsel was informed (a juror allegedly had stated
that the jury had discussed the parole law). His failure to interview any of
the State's witnesses led to his being "surprised" by the sheriff's testimony
concerning key out-of-court admissions by the defendant. Counsel admitted
that he would have advised applicant to take the five-year plea offer by the
State had he known of the out-of-court statement. Although counsel's fail-
ure to object to evidence was cited by the court as part of the mix of repre-
sentation falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, the court
cited specifically the failure to investigate possible jury misconduct and the
failure to interview the State's potential witnesses as evidence that was "suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome."74 There is a suggestion in
the case, however, that failure to make timely objections cannot be justified
by a mere claim of trial strategy. Absent evidence to the contrary, the court
could find that the State's case had not-been put to the "adversarial testing
process" required by Strickland.75
Co-counsel can claim on defendant's behalf that leading trial counsel's
performance was ineffective and subject to review under the Strickland stan-
dard.76 An interesting question that has been avoided so far is whether
counsel on appeal can claim that he himself was ineffective as trial counsel.
The failure to object properly at trial will preclude the appellate court's con-
sideration of the merits of a defendant's claimed error. In such instances,
the only avenue of relief is a claim that the failure to preserve the error was
ineffectiveness. 77 Counsel claiming that he or she was ineffective may on its
face seem inappropriate, but will the mere fact that appellate counsel is the
69. 790 S.W.2d at 306.
70. Id
71. Id.
72. 785 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
73. Id. at 396.
74. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
75. Id. at 395.
76. Paulsel v. State, 784 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
77. Of course, a single failure to preserve error likely will not constitute ijieffective assist-
ance if the representation is otherwise adequate. See supra note 58.
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same attorney who tried the case in trial court excuse raising a colorable
claim of ineffectiveness?
The court of criminal appeals has held that a defendant has ten additional
days to prepare his case under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article
28.10 whenever a charging instrument is amended, regardless of the nature
of the amendment. 78 In Sodipo v. State79 the State amended the indictment
before jury selection to change the cause number in the enhancement para-
graph. The trial court denied the defense's request for an additional ten days
to prepare for trial. The court of criminal appeals rejected the lower court's
determination that since the only function of the enhancement paragraph
was to provide notice of the prior conviction, the trial court did not err.80
The court found nothing in the legislative history of article 28.10 to support
the State's theory that some amendments are to be regarded as trivial for
purposes of the statute. Moreover, as a mandatory statute, its violation was
not subject to harmless error analysis. In Rent v. State81 the Sodipo rule was
held equally applicable to the amendment of an information.
D. Guilty Pleas
Former Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.02, the substance of
which is now contained in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(b)(1), has
had a checkered and confused history. These provisions allow a defendant
making a bargained guilty plea to preserve an adverse ruling on a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence that ordinarily would be waived by the plea.8 2
The obvious purpose is to encourage guilty pleas in cases in which the only
contested issue is a matter raised by pre-trial motion. Formerly, the court of
criminal appeals had held that any impropriety in the ruling concerning evi-
dence would in effect be harmless error if the defendant made a judicial ad-
mission of guilt.8 3 In a later case the court found that the policy underlying
the rule would be better served by not regarding the judicial confession as a
bar to consideration on appeal of the adverse ruling on the pretrial motion. 4
Finally, in Johnson v. State 8 5 the court held that reversal because of trial
error was not required if the plea was supported by evidence "independent of
the judicial confession and the tainted evidence."86 Johnson was recently
overruled by McKenna v. State8 7 in which the court held that if the ob-
jected-to evidence is "instrumental in" or was somehow "used" in securing
the conviction, the appellate court must reach the merits of the appeal.88
78. See Sodipo v. State, No. 1390-88 (Tex. Crim. App., Sept. 12, 1990) (not yet reported).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. No. 1090-89 (Tex. Crim. App., Sept. 12, 1990) (not yet reported) (per curiam).
82. TEx. R. App. P. 40(b).
83. Brewster v. State, 606 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
84. Morgan v. State, 688 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
85. 722 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
86. Id. at 423-24.
87. 780 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
88. Id. at 799. The court relied on Kraft v. State, 762 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988).
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The court rejected an approach that would require the appellate court to
determine the extent to which the trial judge's ruling contributed to the con-
viction and instead held that any contribution was sufficient.89
In McKenna, since the State preserved the option of using the objected-to
evidence and the defendant did not stipulate and consent to the other evi-
dence of guilt until his motion to suppress was denied, the tainted evidence
was regarded as having contributed "in some measure to the State's leverage
in the plea bargaining process." 90 McKenna appears to eliminate the possi-
bility that an adverse ruling on the motion to suppress will be regarded as
harmless when the defendant pleads guilty after the ruling was made.91 One
might well ask why the court did not simply rule that the reviewing court
must always reach the merits of the pretrial motion.
E. Jury Selection
The court of criminal appeals continues to flesh out the procedure for
making a Batson 92 claim of unconstitutional use of peremptory challenges
by the State to strike venirepersons solely because of race. In Dewberry v.
State93 the court concluded that use of ten strikes to exclude five of six
blacks from the jury established a prima facie case of discrimination, because
under Batson a "pattern" of strikes can give rise to an inference of discrimi-
nation.94 When the defendant makes a prima facie case for discrimination,
89. Id.
90. Id. at 800 (quoting Kraft v. State, 762 S.W.2d at 614 (rex. Crim. App. 1988)).
91. An exception might be a stipulation by the State before the defendant pleads that it
will not use the evidence despite its being ruled admissible by the court, a sort of post hoc
confession of error. In any event, an abundance of caution suggests that defense counsel make
clear on the record that the decision to plead is based on the adverse ruling on the pretrial
motion. Moreover, defense counsel must not overlook the procedural requirements for the
appeal. Jones v. State, No. 0038-89 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 1990), illustrates a potential
trap for the defendant seeking to appeal after a guilty plea as authorized under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 49(b)(1). TEx. R. APp. P. 49(b)(1). (Note that an acronym sometimes
used for the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure is "TRAP.") The rule requires that the
notice of appeal after a bargained plea must state either that the trial court granted permission
to appeal or that the matter was raised by pretrial motion. In Jones the original notice of
appeal filed by the defendant specified nothing other than notice of appeal was given. When
the defect in the notice was pointed out, counsel filed an amended notice specifying the matters
raised in his pretrial motion to quash and stated that permission was given by the trial court to
appeal. Counsel, however, did not request an extension of time to file under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 41(b)(2). The court of appeals held that Texas Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 83 gave it power to allow defendant "a reasonable time to correct or amend" the defect
but the court of criminal appeals disagreed. It held, in a 5-4 decision, that rule 83 could not be
used to cure a defect in the notice of appeal under rule 40(b)(1). Counsel must utilize rule
41(b)(l) for an extension of time to file a proper notice of appeal.
92. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Seubert v. State, 787 S.W.2d 68 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990), the court applied Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990), and held that
the Sixth Amendment right to venire selected from a fair cross-section of the community was
not violated by the use of peremptories to exclude members of a certain distinctive group. But
three judges in Seubert emphasized that five concurring and dissenting Supreme Court Justices
in Holland apparently would allow a non-minority to raise a Batson challenge. 787 S.W.2d at
72. This issue is pending before the Supreme Court. Powers v. Ohio, cert granted, 110 S. Ct.
1109 (1990).
93. 776 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
94. Id. at 591.
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the prosecutor must provide more than merely neutral explanations. In-
stead, according to the court of criminal appeals in Whitsey v. State,95 the
prosecutor must give a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of "legiti-
mate reasons" for the peremptory challenges. 96
In Keeton v. State97 a case decided a year before Whitsey, the court pur-
ported to reject a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 98 The Whitsey
plurality, however, openly embraced that standard of review, claiming
through Judge Miller, that it was similar in effect to the Keeton standard. 99
Judge McCormick, in his dissent, feared the plurality's version of the
"clearly erroneous" standard in this context meant a reweighing of the evi-
dence and a de novo determination of whether the strike was racially moti-
vated.10 The real impact of Whitsey is the affirmance of what seems clear in
Batson: there must be something to review, that is, there must be a "plausi-
ble" basis on the record for the challenge.
The untimeliness of a Batson motion or the failure to make out a prima
facie case of racial discrimination may be waived by the State. 101 In Salazar
v. State 10 2 the court emphasized as it had in Dewberry v. State 10 3 the analo-
gous factual inquiry in Title VII discrimination cases. If the State has prop-
erly responded as if the defendant had made out a prima facie case of
discrimination, whether the defendant did so or not is irrelevant.1°+ If the
State has not properly responded, the issue as to whether the defendant has
made out a prima facie case is subject to appellate review.105
F. Evidence
Because the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence are four years old, a
number of cases involving the interpretation of those rules are reaching the
Texas appellate courts. The admissibility of expert testimony under Texas
Rule of Criminal Evidence 702 has been and will be a frequently litigated
issue. In Duckett v. State l06 the court of criminal appeals noted that under
the new rule, expert testimony is not excluded merely because it encom-
passes or embraces an "ultimate" issue or fact.'0 7 The test is whether "the
95. 796 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
96. Id. at 713 (quoting Batson at 98 n.20).
97. 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
98. Id. at 870.
99. 796 S.W.2d at 726.
100. Id. at 741, 743 (McCormick, J., dissenting). The clearly erroneous standard, like the
Keeton standard, purports to defer to the trial judge's finding, but the standard is not deferen-
tial enough for Judge McCormick. On the other hand, it is too deferential for concurring
Judge Teague, who would require that the reasons for challenge found by a trial court to be
race-neutral be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 728, 735 (Teague, J.
concurring).
101. Cooper v. State, 791 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
102. 795 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
103. 776 S.W.2d 589 (Tek. Crim. App. 1989).
104. 795 S.W.2d at 192.
105. Id.
106. 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
107. Id. at 914.
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expert's testimony, if believed, will assist an untrained layman trier of fact to
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue... and whether it is
otherwise admissible under general rules of relevant admissibility."108 In
Duckett the State presented an expert in child sexual abuse investigations to
testify concerning the "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome" which helps explain
a child's seemingly contradictory conduct after abuse has allegedly occurred.
The defense had effectively impeached the child complainant's testimony by
showing differences between her courtroom testimony and earlier videotaped
statements. The court ruled that the expert testimony was admissible even
though the testimony embraced the issue of the complainant's credibility. 109
The witness did not cross the line between assisting the trier of fact and
replacing the trier of fact as decision maker because the testimony "was in
the nature of background rehabilitative evidence."' 10
The fear expressed in Judge Teague's dissenting opinion that Texas trial
courts are now wide open to "snake oil peddlers" disguised as experts"'
may be overstated but the scope of admissible expert testimony undoubtedly
has been expanded by the new rules." 2 In Pierce v. State,1 3 for example, the
court held that it was not error to exclude expert testimony on the risks of
misidentification but the court expressly stated that "we do not hold that
expert testimony concerning eyewitnesses should be excluded in all cases
. "... 114 The court suggests a different result or at least a harder case if the
expert in Pierce had "fit" his testimony to the testimony of the witnesses in
the case rather than testifying generally concerning the inherent unreliability
of eyewitness identification.' 15
In Spence v. State "116 the court ruled that bite mark evidence - compari-
son through an expert of the defendant's bite pattern with bite marks on
victim's body - was admissible.' 17 The court noted that the data base was
presently insufficient to conclude that each individual's dentition was
unique, but that there was unanimous agreement among adontologists that
"if even one point of dissimilarity is found between the suspect's dentition
and the bite mark then it may be said with certainty that the suspect did not
make the bite mark [and]... that suspect may be eliminated."'" 8 There also
is disagreement among the experts on the exact number of similarities
108. Id.
109. Id. at 915.
110. Id. at 920.
111. Id. at 921.
112. In Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), a pre-rule 702 case
relied on by the court of appeals in Duckett, the court of criminal appeals upheld the exclusion
of psychiatric testimony to impeach the credibility of a State's witness. The court of criminal
appeals justified the Hopkins exclusion as not inconsistent with its admission of the expert
testimony in Duckett because the psychiatric evidence in Hopkins would not "assist" the jury.
Duckett, 797 S.W. 2d at 911.
113. 777 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
114. Id. at 416 n.5.
115. Id. at 415-16.
116. 795 S.W.2d 743 (rex. Crim. App. 1990).
117. Id. at 750-52.
118. Id. at 751.
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needed to make a positive identification. The court found, however, that
"bite mark evidence has received sufficient general acceptance by recognized
experts in the field of forensic odontology that it is unnecessary for us to
consider the applicability of the Frye test to this cause."'1 19 The court must
have been saying that because the technique has received general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community (forensic odontology), it need not con-
sider whether some standard other than the Frye standard of general accept-
ance is applicable under the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence to determine
the admissibility of expert testimony. The court may directly confront that
issue, however, in the context of DNA fingerprinting, the highly-publicized
and controversial technology that involves comparison of minute tissue sam-
ples by genetic probes. Review has been granted in a case in which an ap-
peals court held the evidence was inadmissible under the Frye test, 120
presumably to resolve the conflict in the courts of appeal. The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals has held that DNA evidence is admissible under the gen-
eral test of relevancy in which the degree of acceptance accorded a scientific
technique goes to weight and credibility, not admissibility. 121
Under the common law "voucher rule," the State was bound by exculpa-
tory testimony elicited from its witnesses on direct examination. In Russeau
v. State 122 the court of criminal appeals held that the voucher rule had been
overruled by Rule of Criminal Evidence 607 which provides in part that the
credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling that witness.1 23 Because the Texas rule is identical to the federal
rule, the court of criminal appeals deemed persuasive the advisory commit-
tee's note to the federal rule. 124 The note specifically stated that the rule was
designed to abandon the rule against impeaching one's own witness as based
on the false premise that a party has a "free choice" in selecting witnesses. 125
A ruling by the court concerning reputation testimony under Texas Rule
of Criminal Evidence 405 has been negated by amendment. In Hernandez v.
State 126 the court of criminal appeals determined that Rule 405 was an out-
growth of prior case law requiring that a witness giving an opinion of the
defendant's character based on knowledge of the defendant's reputation
must first have been "substantially familiar" with that reputation.127 Ac-
cordingly, the State's witnesses could not give their conclusions about a de-
fendant's reputation when those conclusions were based on conversations
with others about the defendant's prior acts and not on discussions with
others about his reputation. The proviso at issue in Hernandez has been
119. Id. at 752.
120. Glover v. State, 787 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, pet. granted).
121. Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, pet. granted).
122. 785 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
123. Id. at 390. The court of criminal appeals suggested in several opinions and several




126. 800 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam).
127. Id. at 525.
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reworded and now requires that a character witness concerning an accused
need only be "familiar" before the date of the offense with either the reputa-
tion of the accused or with the facts on which the opinion is based. 128 Pre-
sumably, under amended rule 405, neither reputation nor opinion testimony
can be based on specific acts, but the long-term observation contemplated by
the prior rule is eliminated.
As a general rule, a prosecutor cannot call a witness for the sole purpose
of having that witness invoke the fifth amendment privilege not to testify.
Noting an exception when "the prosecutor's case would be seriously
prejudiced by a failure to offer him as a witness," the court in Coffey v.
State12 9 upheld the prosecutor's action in calling a witness who had been
granted use immunity when the prosecutor knew the witness would invoke
the privilege notwithstanding the immunity. The rationale of the court was
that since the witness had no valid basis for refusing to testify, it was not
error for the jury to hear the witness invoke it. 130 In his concurring opinion,
Judge Miller stated that he could see little difference in impact on the jury of
invocation of an invalid as opposed to valid claim of privilege. 131 While the
majority acknowledged that the jury could draw a negative inference, it held
that the defendant was not unfairly prejudiced. 132 The message of Coffey
apparently is that the State has a right to have a witness who has been
granted immunity invoke the privilege before a jury unless the record reflects
that the prosecutor has in some way tried to "make hay" out of the witness
doing so. Also, the prosecutor apparently is not required to show need as a
predicate; the burden is on the defense to show unfairness.
In Leal v. State 13 3 a tape-recorded conversation between the defendant
and an alleged murder co-conspirator cooperating with the State was admit-
ted into evidence without it being translated from Spanish to English by a
sworn interpreter. (It was not clear who actually prepared the transcript.) 34
Regarding the admissibility of a tape recording of a conversation in a foreign
language as a question of first impression in Texas, the court held that such a
tape may be admissible but admissibility is to be judged under Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, article 38.30.135 On motion or objection, article 38.30
requires a sworn interpreter to translate the conversation.1 36
In Spence v. State137 the court looked to its earlier decision of Zani v.
State 138 and upheld admission of testimony from a State's witness who had
128. Order adopting Amendments to Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, 53 Tex. B.I. 919
(Sept. 1990).
129. 796 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting United States v. Vandeti, 623
F.2d 1144) (6th Cir. 1980)). -
130. Id. at 179.
131. Id. at 180 (Miller, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. 782 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
134. Id. at 847 n.4.
135. Id. at 849.
136. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.30 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
137. 795 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
138. 758 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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been hypnotized by a Texas Ranger before trial. Apparently, if the trial
judge considers the dangers of hypnosis as cited in Zani as well as the factors
set out in Zani affecting trustworthiness, he will be presumed to have prop-
erly admitted the evidence assuming that he had some knowledge of the
expertise and qualifications of the hypnotist conducting the session. 139 Con-
frontation is not denied by admitting the testimony of the witness who un-
derwent pretrial hypnosis, even if the witness can recall something at trial
that he could not remember before trial, because that fact can be brought out
on cross-examination. 140
Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 38.072,141 a statement
by a child sex offense victim twelve years old or under that first describes the
offense (an "outcry" statement) is admissible through the person to whom it
was made as an exception to the hearsay rule. 142 The statute's constitution-
ality was sustained in Buckley v. State 143 in which the defendant's adult
daughter was allowed to testify about the victim's outcry statement. The
victim later was called by the State and the defendant was allowed to cross-
examine but defense counsel did not question her about the outcry statement
then nor when she was later recalled by the defendant. Admitting the outcry
statement was held not to violate the right of confrontation under either the
federal or state constitutions because the child was available for cross-exami-
nation at trial.144 Belated cross-examination can be a constitutionally ade-
quate substitute for contemporaneous cross-examination. Only if the
opportunity for full and effective cross-examination is not possible at trial
will particularized showings of necessity and indicia of reliability be required
as a predicate for the outcry statement's admission.
The court of criminal appeals revisited the companion provision of Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, article 38.071, dealing with the admissibility
generally of child sexual offense victim's statements and the presentation of
the child's testimony at trial.145 In Briggs v. State 146 a videotaped interview
with a twelve-year-old victim of an alleged sexual assault was admitted
under the former article 38.071, section 2. The child appeared as a witness
139. Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
140. Id. at 757 (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)).
141. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 38.072 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
142. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The court of criminal
appeals in Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), dealt with who is an "out-
cry witness" under the statute. A seven-year-old complainant told her teacher that she was
having problems at home after the teacher had talked to the class about sexual abuse. At the
defendant's trial for indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault, a child protection
specialist from the Texas Department of Human Services was allowed to testify concerning the
details of statements made to him by the complainant concerning the offense. The trial court
was held not to have abused its discretion in ruling the DHS specialist was the "outcry wit-
ness" as the "first person ... other than the defendant, to whom the child made a statement
about the offense." The record's failure to reflect what the complainant told her teacher left
nothing more than a "general allusion" to the offense rather than a statement "that in some
discernable manner describes the alleged offense." Id. at 91.
143. 786 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
144. Id. at 360-61.
145. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
146. 789 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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for the state at trial and was cross-examined by the defendant. Defense
counsel did not object on constitutional grounds to the admission of the
videotape but the court of appeals nevertheless reversed on the basis of Long
v. State,147 which held that the former article 38.071, section 2, was facially
unconstitutional.1 48 The court of criminal appeals concluded that the ap-
peals court was correct in holding that the defendant need not object to pre-
serve a claim under a facially unconstitutional statute. Further, the court
admitted it was wrong in Long to hold the statute facially unconstitu-
tional. 149 Therefore, the defendant's failure to object waived his claim of
error.150 Briggs is significant because of the court of criminal appeal's be-
lated recognition of the qualified nature of the right of confrontation that
had been earlier acknowledged in Buckley. The court emphasized that ad-
missibility of pretrial videotapes depends essentially on whether the defend-
ant is afforded a "full and effective cross-examination."' 151 On the merits,
Briggs' confrontation rights probably were not violated.
One may surmise that the court in Briggs was tidying up the setting for its
ultimate consideration of the constitutionality of the new article 38.071. Just
after Briggs was handed down, the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided that confrontation was adequately protected in a closed-circuit presen-
tation of a child victim's testimony under a Maryland statutory procedure in
which the child was subject to cross-examination and was seen and heard by
the defendant.15 2 The right to face-to-face confrontation, similar to the right
to cross-examination, is not absolute, and may be limited to the extent spe-
cifically found necessary by the trial court to protect the child from the
trauma of testifying in the presence of the defendant.153
G. Jury Charge
Jurors may not always understand their instructions, but they do try.
Criminal juries may be predisposed to convict, but the jurors take their oaths
to apply the law seriously and will require proof beyond a reasonable doubt
as they perceive it. Accordingly, counsel should not underestimate the im-
portance of the jury charge.
In a recent case, the jury charge by the terms of its application paragraph
required the State to prove defendant's participation in an offense of at-
tempting to obtain drugs by forgery both as a party and as the actor who
actually presented the forged writing.1 54 The failure of the evidence to show
even possession of the forged writing by the defendant made the evidence
147. 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), discussed in Schmolesky, Trial and Appellate
Criminal Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L. 1. 601, 632-33 (1990).
148. 742 S.W.2d at 323.
149. 789 S.W.2d at 921.
150. Id. at 924.
151. Id. at 922.
152. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
153. Id. at 3167.
154. Nickerson v. State 782 S.W. 2d 887, 891-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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insufficient to support the conviction under the charge given.'155 Even if the
matter required to be proven in the charge is surplusage because it does not
describe or explain an essential element of the offense, failure to prove the
matter beyond a reasonable doubt will result in an acquittal. 156
Defense counsel should be careful that the jury charge accurately reflects
the applicable law. Confusion still prevails concerning penal code defini-
tions, particularly the relationship between culpable mental states in offense
definitions and the elements of the offense. For example, in Haggins v.
State,15 7 a conviction arising out of an injury to a child was reversed because
a convoluted jury charge allowed the jury to convict without finding a culpa-
ble mental state as to the result of injury to the child. Of course, counsel
must object to the charge given or request a proper charge to preserve the
claim of error. Even if counsel does preserve the error, the defective instruc-
tion will be subject to the Almanza 15 1 harm analysis. Chances are, however,
that an improper definition of the offense in the jury instructions will be
reversible as an error calculated to prejudice the defendant.159
H. Sentencing
As noted in last year's survey,l6 the new Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, article 37.07, section 3a, has injected an element of uncertainty into the
scope of permissible evidence at non-capital sentencing. On its face, the lan-
guage appears to expand the range of admissible evidence. But the open-
ended standard of relevance requires the courts or the legislature to establish
what forms of evidence may be considered.16 1
A case under the prior statute illustrates the problem with the vague stan-
dard of relevance. In Miller-El v. State 162 the jury sentenced the defendant
to separate life sentences after convicting her as a party with her husband to
the offenses of murder and attempted murder. The court of criminal appeals
held that evidence concerning the victim's medical condition and prognosis
was admissible at the punishment stage of defendant's trial.1 63 That evi-
dence included the future loss of bladder and bowel control, sexual and pro-
155. Id.
156. See Arceneaux v. State, No. 1092-87 (rex. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 1990) (instruction
required State to prove exhibit introduced by State was cocaine when it was only the package
that contained cocaine).
157. 785 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam).
158. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
1901 (1987).
159. See White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 809, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S.Ct. 2575 (1990). Although error to refuse a requested instruction on the failure of the de-
fendant to testify at the punishment stage, it was harmless in view of the evidence at both the
guilt/innocence and punishment stages: "we cannot say the trial court's failure to give the
requested charge was calculated to injure the rights of the defendant" nor that it "contributed
to the jury's answers to the special issues." Id.
160. Schmolesky, Trial and Appellate Criminal Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
44 Sw. L.J. 601, 607-08 (1990).
161. Id. at 608.
162. 782 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 790 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990).
163. Id. at 893.
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creative functions, and possibly the ability even to use a wheelchair. Under
the test of relevancy applied at the guilt/innocence stage, however, the court
would not admit evidence of the victim's future hardships as a paraplegic.
But the issue at the punishment stage of a non-capital case under the-then
article 37.07, section 3(a), is a matter of policy, not of factual relevance,
according to Judge Clinton.'I" Because the legislature has not set a coherent
policy, the court has had to fill the "policy void" 1 65 by including evidence of
the circumstances of the offense and the particular circumstances of defend-
ant within the proper range of admissible evidence. Judge Clinton then con-
cluded that the extent of injury, including anticipated future injury was a
circumstance of the offense.166
In Miller-El Judge Clinton distinguished Booth v. Maryland,167 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that a "victim impact statement"
(VIS) was inadmissible at capital sentencing.168 The VIS contained informa-
tion related to the impact on the family of the victim's death and the per-
sonal characteristics of the victim. The Court considered the information
inflammatory and likely to distract the jury from relevant evidence when
reaching a verdict. 169 The information was immaterial to the defendant's
culpability and carried with it the risk the jury would impose the death sen-
tence because of irrelevant factors beyond the defendant's knowledge when
he acted. 170 Judge Clinton concluded that the future injuries in Miller-El
were not unrelated to the defendant's blameworthiness. 171 Apparently, be-
cause the defendant intended or should have anticipated the victim's death
(seemingly obvious if she were properly convicted of attempted murder), the
future injuries could be "rationally attributed" to the defendant. Moreover,
Judge Clinton concluded that preventing the jury from hearing evidence of
the victim's future hardships would be tantamount to precluding retribution
as a factor for the jury's consideration when assessing punishment.1 72
A more satisfactory approach to Booth would have been simply to con-
clude that the future injuries of the victim were a direct circumstance of the
crime, distinguishing the evidence in Booth of impact on family and charac-
teristics of the victim. In Booth the key factor was that the VIS evidence
could improperly influence the jury's decision on imposing the death sen-
tence. 173 In Miller-El the defendant obviously contemplated the death of the
victim, but can it reasonably be concluded that she was aware of the risk of
future pain and suffering? Judge Clinton's reference to retribution may sug-
164. Id. at 896.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 482 U.S. 486 (1987).
168. Id. at 509.
169. Id. at 508.
170. Id. at 504.
171. Miller-El, 782 S.W.2d at 896.
172. Id. at 892, 897.
173. "Allowing the jury to rely on a VIS therefore could result in imposing the death
sentence because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant
to the decision to kill." Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987).
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gest that the nature of the crime itself may be considered apart from the state
of mind of the offender.
What is relevant at sentencing should arise in a number of other contexts.
The extent to which unadjudicated offenses can be proved up by the State at
the penalty stage to establish the defendant's character, for example, divided
the Beaumont Court of Appeals in Huggins v. State.174 The State had intro-
duced at the penalty stage of the defendant's murder prosecution several
instances of his petty theft and one instance of unauthorized use of and dam-
age to an automobile. The majority concluded that the amended article
37.07, section 3a, had overruled the holding of Murphy v. State175 that
unadjudicated offenses were not part of the admissible prior criminal record
of the defendant. 176 The majority interpreted the legislative intent behind
amended article 37.07, section 3a as allowing for admission of evidence of
unadjudicated offenses at the trial court's discretion. 177 Justice Burgess
agreed with the result, but in a concurring opinion argued that retaining the
language "prior criminal record" would have been unnecessary had the leg-
islature not intended any limitation on the offenses to be admitted.' 78 In
deciding this and other issues under the new statute, the court of criminal
appeals likely will have to elaborate on the purposes of punishment because
the issue is no longer one of policy but of relevancy.
II. APPEAL
A. Standard of Review
The court of criminal appeals continued to apply its reasonable hypothesis
theory in reviewing circumstantial evidence cases: the evidence must exclude
to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's
guilt.179 In Jackson v. Virginia 180 the Supreme Court established the consti-
tutional standard for determining the sufficiency of evidence on review. 18
The court of criminal appeals has claimed that the Jackson standard is the
single standard used in all cases. The reasonable hypothesis theory in cir-
cumstantial evidence cases has been characterized as "an analytical con-
struct" consistent with Jackson rather than being a separate standard. 18 2
The court could adopt the rational hypothesis test as a separate standard
which exceeds the due process minimum rational juror test of Jackson. In-
174. 795 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, pet. ref'd).
175. 777 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
176. Id at 50.
177. Huggins, 795 S.W. 2d at 911. The statute provides for "any matter the court deems
relevant to sentencing, including the prior criminal record.. . ." TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. art. 37.07, § 3a (Vernon Supp. 1989).
178. Huggins, 795 S.W.2d at 912 (Burgess, J. concurring).
179. See Skelton v. State, 795 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, Ill
S.Ct. 210 (1990).
180. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
181. The Court expressed the standard as whether "after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319 (emphasis in original).
182. Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 238 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
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stead, however, the court chooses to pretend that the reasonable hypothesis
theory may be rationalized within the Jackson formula. The rationale is that
if there is a rational inference other than guilt possible from the evidence, a
finding of guilt is not a rational finding. This is legal sophistry. It is no
wonder, then, that the court of criminal appeals has granted review in sev-
eral cases to reconsider the standard of review in circumstantial evidence
cases. 183
Whether the reasonable hypothesis test is merely an analytical construct
or a different standard, it clearly makes a difference, particularly in "affirma-
tive link" proof of possession cases such as Skelton v. State.18 4 The jury in
Skelton convicted the defendant of capital murder in the death of a man
against whom the defendant had made threats. Two weeks after the defend-
ant's threats the man was killed by a blast from a bomb placed under his
pickup truck. The evidence showed the defendant in possession of dynamite
and magnets of the type used in the bombing. Because no evidence con-
nected the defendant with the actual placing of the bomb nor showed he
procured another to place it, the hypothesis that someone else committed the
crime was not excluded. Of course, if the hypothesis of innocence claimed
by the defendant is implausible and incompatible with the other evidence, as
it was in Willis v. State,I s the conviction will be affirmed. Similarly, in Wil-
liams v. State 186 the court of criminal appeals upheld the defendant's convic-
tion of possession of cocaine over a claim of insufficiency of evidence. 1 7 The
defendant had been arrested and placed in the back seat of a police patrol
car. The court of criminal appeals reversed the court of appeals holding that
the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant was the person who de-
posited rocks of cocaine found in the back seat of the patrol car.188 The
police testimony that the defendant was the only person in the back seat of
the car since the shift began, when they had searched the police car and
found the area behind the back seat clean, excluded any reasonable hypothe-
sis except that of guilt. Any possibility that someone other than the defend-
ant had placed the cocaine in the back seat or that the officers had planted it
was unreasonable, even though the officers failed to discover any cocaine on
the defendant's person when they conducted the pat-down search. 18 9
In Meraz v. State 190 the court of criminal appeals held that under the
article V, section 6, of the Texas Constitution, the courts of appeal have
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve questions of whether the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence supports a jury verdict.191 The court thereby
rejected the standard it had fabricated from the "rational juror" test of Jack-
183. Allen v. State, 786 S.W.2d 738 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, pet. granted) and Mc-
Carty v. State, 788 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, pet. granted).
184. 795 S.W.2d 162 (rex. Crim. App. 1989).
185. 785 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 279 (1990).
186. 784 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 430.
189. Id.
190. 785 S.W.2d 146 ('rex. Crim. App. 1990).
191. Id at 154. The standard of review is "whether after considering all the evidence rele-
1991)
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
son v. Virginia: whether any rational trier of fact could have found the de-
fendant failed to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Under the rejected standard, if the prosecution presented any evidence to
rebut the defense, a court of appeals would never overturn a jury finding that
the defense was not proved. Thus, in Meraz the court of criminal appeals
held that the court of appeals applied the correct standard when it reversed
the conviction because the competency jury's finding that the defendant was
competent to stand trial was against the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence. 192 Relying on Tibbs v. Florida 193 the court held that remand
to the trial court was proper because the appeals court finding did not
amount to an acquittal which would bar retrial. 194
B. Harmless Error
The harmless error concept is addressed frequently in Texas criminal ap-
pellate courts decision. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has grappled
with the meaning and application of this concept as codified in Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(2). The rule as stated is essentially a codifica-
tion of the harmless error rule applied by the United States Supreme Court
to constitutional errors.' 95 The Texas rule, however, applies to non-consti-
tutional errors as well. To be classified as harmless under the rule, it must be
proven by the State "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no
contribution to the conviction or to the punishment."1 96
The court of criminal appeals has taken steps to clear up the confusion as
to the application of the rule which has been characterized as "in a develop-
mental, if [not] (sic) dynamic stage."' 97 The rule applies generally to all
errors, but not errors in the jury charge that do not implicate constitutional
rights.198 Accordingly, the rule applies to jury argument error199 and to the
vant to the issue at hand, the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence so as to be manifestly unjust." Id. at 155.
192. See Patel v. State, 787 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (applying Meraz to
the defense of insanity).
193. 457 U.S. 31, 37 (1987) (holding that reversal for "insufficient evidence" will bar retrial
but reversal on the basis of "weight of evidence" will not).
194. Of course, a finding of incompetency, unlike insanity, would not implicate the Double
Jeopardy clause anyway because it would be the result of a civil rather than criminal proceed-
ing. See Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
195. Bennett v. State, 766 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3229
(1989).
196. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(2).
197. Whiting v. State, 797 S.W.2d 45, 49 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
198. Belyeu v. State, 791 S.W.2d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (involving "antiparties"
charge at punishment stage of death penalty case).
199. Whiting v. State, 797 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Haynie v. State, 751
S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683 (fex. Crim. App.
1990), is an example of an extravagant application of harmless error to jury argument. The
prosecutor's argument that there was "only one person here that knows why" someone who
had killed two people would sign his own name to the couple's stolen credit card obviously was
an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify. The error was found harmless in
part because the argument anticipated defense counsel's argument that asked the jury why a
guilty person would do that. The "anticipated argument" rationale assumes the defense would
have made the argument notwithstanding the prosecutor's comments. But it ignores the possi-
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parole law charge held unconstitutional in Arnold v. State.2°° An important
exception to application of harmless error is the violation of a mandatory
statute. For example, in Hernandez v. State,20 1 the court of criminal appeals
held that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53j)(2) required the trial court
to fulfill an indigent appellant's request to include in the record on appeal
the voir dire examination of prospective jurors who were successfully chal-
lenged for cause or were the subject of agreed challenges. 20 2 The court justi-
fied the mandatory nature of the rule because the harmless error analysis
would necessarily imply a colorable need requirement that appellate counsel,
who had not tried the case, could not demonstrate. Care should be taken,
however, not to regard a statute as mandatory simply because of obligatory
language. In Roberts v. State20 3 three co-defendants who had been severed
for trial agreed on an order of trial that was ignored by the trial court despite
the language of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 36.10, which ap-
pears to give severed co-defendants the absolute right to so agree. The court
of criminal appeals rejected the State's argument that violation of article
36.10 would never be disadvantageous to an accused, because there may be
situations in which a co-defendant may have material evidence that will not
be available unless that co-defendant is tried first and acquitted.2 4 In Rob-
erts, however, there was no evidence that the defendant who was tried first
was harmed; one co-defendant did not invoke the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege and testified favorably, and the other was not called, probably because
he could be impeached by prior offenses. Acknowledging that predecessor
versions of article 36.10 had been regarded as mandatory, the court noted
some recent slippage and reluctance to reverse simply because of a viola-
tion.205 Apparently because the sole purpose of the statute is to ensure that
another's testimony is available, being tried first cannot harm the defendant
who is not deprived of that testimony. Thus, although a violation of article
36.10 may be harmless, it would rarely be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt where the co-defendants do not testify. 206 In that instance, the court
could not assess the impact of not having the testimony.
bility that defense counsel made the argument only because he was compelled to do so by the
prosecutor's comments. Madden also illustrates the recurring irony of the harmless error doc-
trine that the more capable a defense attorney is, the less likely any error will be found
prejudicial.
200. 786 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 110 (1990).
201. 785 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam).
202. The court relied on McGee v. State, 711 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986),
aff'd, 774 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1535 (1990) (holding
that TEx. R. App. P. 53(j)(2)'s predecessor, TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.. 40.09(5), was
mandatory).
203. 784 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
204. Id. at 435.
205. Id. at 437. Of course, the conditions for application of the mandatory statute must be
met before reversal is automatic. Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 2193 (1990), held that a demand for a jury shuffle was not made timely in a
capital case in which the judge first questions the panel. In this case, counsel made his motion
after the trial court had conducted its initial examination. In non-capital cases, the motion
would have to be made before the State initiated questioning.
206. See Roberts v. State, 784 S.W. 2d 430, 438 (rex. Crim. App. 1990).
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Although appellant does not have the burden to demonstrate harm at-
tending trial error,20 7 aside from that rare situation in which the claimed
error cannot be harmless, 208 counsel should anticipate a harmless error ar-
gument by the State. The court of criminal appeals recently has attempted
to set out a workable standard for making the harmless error determination.
Harris v. State2°9 set out general guidelines for making the harmless error
analysis, and Arnold v. State210 considered specifically the analysis to be ap-
plied in the context of parole law instructions.
In Harris the court noted that the role of the appellate court in conducting
a harmless error analysis is not to determine how it would have decided the
case, but to determine whether the error affected the conviction or punish-
ment.21 1 An overwhelming evidence of guilt test is an erroneous standard
because rule 8 1(b)(2) clearly focuses on the error itself and not on the weight
of the untainted evidence.212 The court acknowledged, however, that it was
impossible to measure the effect of the error without also considering the
other evidence properly before the court. The properly admitted evidence is
not to be weighed alone or tested to determine whether it is cumulative with
the erroneous evidence.2 13 The proper focus of the weight of untainted evi-
dence of guilt in the harmless error analysis is an assessment of whether
"overwhelming evidence dissipates the error's effect upon the jury's function
in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict. '214
Recognizing the subjective nature of Rule 81(b)(2), the court set out a
basic framework for appellate courts to consider in applying the rule, while
noting that the main concern of the reviewing court should be the integrity
of the criminal justice process and a defendant's right to a fair trial.215 The
factors set out in Harris to assess the effect of the error include: 1) the source
and nature of the error; 2) the extent to which the state used the error
throughout the course of the trial; 3) the probable collateral implications of
the error; 4) the probable weight a juror would put on such an error; and 5)
the likelihood that a finding of harmlessness would encourage the State to
repeat the error with impunity.2 1 6
These factors should be applied within a two-step framework: 1) isolate
the error and its effects; and 2) ask whether a rational trier of fact "might
have reached a different result if the error and its effects had not re-
sulted. ' 21 7 Applying that analysis, the court found harmless the erroneous
207. Id. at 437 n.2.
208. See Russell v. State, 790 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (harmless error analysis
inapplicable to State's failure to meet its burden of proof of proving finality of a conviction as a
predicate for enhancement).
209. 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
210. 786 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 110 (1990).
211. 790 S.W.2d at 585.
212. Id. at 585, n.16.
213. Id. at 586.
214. Id. at 587.
215. Id. at 587-88.
216. Id. at 587.
217. Id. at 588.
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admission of two extraneous incidents of theft and robbery in a homicide
prosecution. 218 The absence of any attempt by the State to taint the trial
process, only passing reference to the robbery after the murder, and the
existence of other overwhelming evidence all demonstrated that "the prob-
able impact of this error on the jury was minimal, if any." 219 Thus, despite
purporting to adopt an impact-on-the-jury test of harmless error, the court
instead embraces the same impact-on-result test it disavows.
In the context of the parole law instruction that was, but is not now un-
constitutional,220 the court of criminal appeals has concluded that it can do
no better than a factorial test of harmless error in which "no specific weight
[is] attached to each factor nor is the presence or absence of any one factor
determinative. ' 221 In Arnold v. State222 the court of criminal appeals set out
the nine factors: 1) whether parole law or good time credits were discussed
during voir dire; 2) the nature of allusions, if any, to parole or good time in
jury argument; 3) whether the jury sent notes to the judge during delibera-
tions concerning parole or good time laws; 4) the actual sentence assessed in
light of the facts of the case, including whether the sentence was divisible by
three, implying reference to advice in the charge concerning parole eligibility
after service of one-third of the sentence; 5) an affirmative finding in the
judgment of the use of a deadly weapon; 6) the facts of the case; 7) prior
criminal record of the defendant; 8) whether curative instructions other than
the ineffectual one in the statute itself were given; and 9) whether defense
counsel objected to the parole law instruction.223
Elaborating on these factors, the Arnold court noted that the presumption
that juries will follow curative instructions was offset by the opposing pre-
sumption under rule 81(b)(2) of harm from an error.224 To prevent shifting
of the State's burden of proof under rule 81(b)(2), the court concluded that
the rule's presumption would prevail.225 Accordingly, unless the State has
met its burden of proof that the error did not contribute to the conviction or
punishment, the curative instruction could not be considered. The court fur-
ther noted that the heinous nature of the crime is a factor that "like beauty,
is in the eyes of the beholder," 226 and should not in itself be assumed to
underlay any severe sentence.
Application of the Arnold factorial test has not been easy in practice. Its
subjective and uncertain application has often caused the court of criminal
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Schmolesky, Trial and Appellate Criminal Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 601, 622-28 (1990).
221. Sato v. State, 797 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
222. 786 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, II1 S.Ct. 110 (1990).
223. This list of Arnold factors is outlined in Brown v. State, 798 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990).
224. Arnold v. State, 786 S.W.2d 295, 310-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S.Ct. 110 (1990).
225. Id. at 311.
226. Id.
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appeals to split.227 If applied strictly, the harmless error formulation would
seldom render the error harmless.223 The State would be required literally
to prove a negative, namely, that the erroneous instruction did not contrib-
ute to the sentence. In other words, the jury may have heard the instruction
but, despite their oath to follow the law, they may have ignored it. As a
practical matter, there is considerable pressure to affirm the sentence if the
error probably did not contribute, or at least did not contribute significantly
to the verdict. The most telling factors emerging from the cases in making
that determination are the extent to which the prosecutor referred to parole
in voir dire or closing argument 229 and the length of the sentence relative to
the facts.230
227. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 798 S.W. 2d 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (two judges dissent-
ing); Sato v. State, 797 S.W. 2d 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (5 to 4 decision); Bugarin v. State;
789 S.W. 2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (three judges dissenting).
228. In fact, strict application could result in harmless error only if the defendant received
the minimum sentence. See Tollett v. State, 799 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
229. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 798 S.W.2d 284, 289 (rex. Crim. App. 1990) (prosecutor's
mention of parole was arguably neutral and fleeting); Johnson v. State, 797 S.W. 2d 658, 661(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (prosecutor's argument "pointedly directed the jury's consideration to
calculating the effect of the parole law and good conduct time"); Sato v. State, 797 S.W. 2d 37,
38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (prosecutor's reference was not at a strategic place but in the mid-
dle of an argument for a deserved sentence); Onumonu v. State, 787 S.W. 2d 958, 960 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (argument pointed directly to jury consideration of parole); Newton v. State,
784 S.W. 2d, 689, 691 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (minimal reference to parole in voir dire or
closing argument).
230. See Brown v. State, 798 S.W. 2d 284, 290 (Tex.Crim. App. 1990) ("mid-range sen-
tence despite such egregious facts" and "not readily divisible by three"); Sato v. State, 797
S.W. 2d 37, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ("sentence here is in accord with the facts" and not
evenly divisible by three).
